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The Political Economy of Civil Islam in Côte d’Ivoire 
 
Marie Miran (SOAS, University of London) 
 
 
 
 
(article paru dans H. Weiss et M. Bröening (éds.), Islamic Democracy?  
Political Islam in Western Africa, 2006, Berlin, Lit Verlag [pour la fondation Friedrich Ebert]) 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 Under the long presidency of Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the “Father” of the 
Ivorian nation and devout builder of one the world’s largest Christian edifices – 
the Roman Catholic basilica of Our Lady of Peace of Yamoussoukro, modeled on 
Saint Peter of Rome – Côte d’Ivoire’s prevalent public image at home and abroad 
was that of a composite stronghold of Christianity, traditional African religions, 
and new prophetic cults, while Islam was of secondary importance. Echoing 
French colonial perceptions, Islam was relegated to folkloric and traditional roles 
in the northern savanna and to the private spheres of disparate local 
communities of migrants and traders in the more fertile and economically 
dynamic South. Since 1994, Houphouët’s successors’ ethnonationalist politics of 
ivoirité (“Ivoirianness”) have contributed to reinforce this public image. Islam has 
been presented as a religion of foreigners and the Dioula and other groups 
originating from the North as citizens of doubtful or circumstantial Ivorian 
pedigree. The protestantization of power following the election of Laurent 
Gbagbo in 2000, celebrated by Evangelicals as the first “Christian” president of 
the country, and a pro-government media-relayed anti-Islamic campaign in the 
immediate aftermath of the breakout of the civil war in September 2002 both 
seemed to confirm the ongoing marginalization of Islam and Muslims in 
contemporary Côte d’Ivoire. 
Though the old perceptions are not without historical foundation, the new 
political ideologies are clearly distorting changing realities. In the second half of 
the 20th century, Islam has slowly but consistently gained ground in all regions 
and most ethnic and social groups of the country, to the point where it has now 
become Côte d’Ivoire’s first religion from a demographic standpoint. Since the 
creation of the Conseil National Islamique (National Islamic Council or CNI) in 
1993, the overarching Islamic federation which is a culmination of two decades of 
grassroots activism by an ever-expanding elite of modernist-minded reformists, 
Ivorian Muslims are less divided, better organized and more vocal in the national 
public sphere than ever before. Throughout the country, including in the main 
cities of the South such as Abidjan, Muslims assert their religious identity openly; 
the civil war has not altered this inclination. Whereas twenty to thirty years ago it 
 2
was almost unconceivable for civil servants to wear the boubou (the traditional 
Muslim gown) at work on Fridays, today it is bon ton to do so. Islam has in fact 
become a well-established national religion, tuned into the modern world’s global 
challenges and the local realities of the plural Ivorian landscape. 
 This chapter surveys the historical genesis and contemporary significance 
of these broad Islamic transformations. It examines the changing fabric of Muslim 
leadership and society as well as some emerging new interpretations of Islam. 
Specifically, it questions the interface between Islam and politics, understood as 
the confluence of the State, civil society and the public sphere. Against portrayals 
of Islam as inherently anti-pluralist and undemocratic, it shows that Côte 
d’Ivoire’s Islamic reform movement has repudiated the goal of an Islamic state, 
mobilized religiously ecumenical support, promoted women's rights, and 
championed republican and secular ideals. Ending with the civil war, it concludes 
that the present conflict is not even remotely a religious one and that Muslim civic 
organizations, along with other religious and secular actors, are indispensable 
partners to reestablish the State’s legitimacy and rebuild a more peaceful society. 
 
  
2. A Pluralistic Religious Context1 
 
2.1. Of Islamization and religious demography 
 
Post-independence Côte d’Ivoire has witnessed one of the fastest growths 
of Islam anywhere on the African continent. But although no one contests the 
progress of the Quranic prophecy, its magnitude has been quantified variably. 
Tied to birth rates but also to international migrations and conversions, this 
progression is undoubtedly difficult to measure: new converts, for instance, tend 
to keep their ethnic names and often go unnoticed as Muslims. Yet the disparity 
in the statistical data is mostly a matter of partisan extrapolations. Many Muslim 
and non-Muslim observers argue that Christian and governmental figures 
minimize the proportion of the Muslim population nationwide, possibly because of 
a conscious or passive mental framework whereby Christianity is a vigorous 
tradition having a special influence on the political culture of the State. The 
politics at stake in religious statistics are nowhere better illustrated than in two 
official reports written by the Institut National de la Statistique (National Statistical 
Institute or INS) and the Conseil économique et social (Economic and Social 
Council or CES) in the heat of the ivoirité polemic.2 Both suggest that Islam was 
no longer the first religion when referred exclusively to the population of Ivorian 
nationals. The progress of Islam in the country thus supposedly only resulted 
from the influx of Muslim foreigners from northern neighboring countries, a 
phenomenon presented as a threat to the nation’s religious balance and ultimate 
unity and harmony. As the sociologist Moriba Touré demonstrated3, this rhetoric 
was mere xenophobia, if only because though it is an established fact that over 
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70% of foreign residents are Muslim, Islamization did not slow down like in-
migration rates did after the economic crisis of the early 1980s.  
Be it as it may, the three official censuses of 1975, 1988 and 1998 record 
the increasing importance of Islam in the Ivorian religious landscape – one of the 
reasons why Islamic organizations have not challenged the State on this issue, 
as happened in 2001-02 in neighboring Ghana. Representing an estimated 
21.7% of the total population in 1957, the Muslim ratio increased to 33.25% in 
1975, 38.7% in 1988 and 38.7% in 1998 (or 43% according to the INS 
intermediary survey of 1996).4 Meanwhile, the Christian population also grew 
from 12.3% in 1957 to 27.4% in 1975, 26.1% in 1988 and 30.3% in 1998 (or 33% 
according to the INS report). Indeed, monotheism’s dynamism in an age of rapid 
urbanization is a defining feature of the religious history of modern Côte d’Ivoire.  
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Islamization brought about a shift in the Muslim population’s status, from 
minority to quasi-majority. This decisive enlargement of scale is the context in 
which Islam and Muslims have become more visible and enterprising in the 
national public sphere. What is more, it has redrawn the country’s religious map. 
The Muslim presence has expanded to the entire Ivorian territory, including the 
South. Whereas in the colonial period Islam spread to the forest regions through 
the almost exclusive agency of migration (the new cities of the developing South 
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were swelled by Dioula traders and other Muslim workers), in the post-
independence era, more and more rural and urban southern autochthons have 
also converted to Islam. There are now Muslims in various proportions in most 
Ivorian ethnic groups, including the Agni, the Baoulé or the Bété. It is therefore a 
misrepresentation to refer to the country’s internal ecological frontier as a divide 
between a predominantly Muslim North and a predominantly Christian South, as 
has been done by some Ivorian and Western media after September 2002.5 
According to the 1998 census, Muslims outnumber Christians (but not Christians 
and other religious groups taken together) in most administrative regions of the 
“global South”. In the North, Evangelicals and to a lesser extent Catholics have 
also pushed the Christian frontier, even though the Savanna remains 
predominantly Muslim. Contrary to popular conceptions, more Muslims live in the 
South than in the North and Muslim concentration is the greatest in Abidjan (41% 
of the 2.7 millions Abidjanese were Muslim in 1998). Mirroring the country’s 
politico-economic centralism, Abidjan has also become Côte d’Ivoire’s most 
influential Islamic center, supplanting Bouaké and the ancient strongholds of the 
northern region. 
 
2.2. Christian-Muslim relations 
 
 In the Ivorian South, Muslims and Christians of various denominations – 
along with a variety of animists – have coexisted peacefully for as long as four 
generations and sometimes more. Families with members belonging to both 
religions are not uncommon. Until at least the early 2000s, neighbors socialized 
regardless of their faith (exchanging Christmas or Tabaski wishes and dishes), 
buyers and sellers bargained in Dioula (the lingua franca of Ivorian markets, 
spoken by many non-Muslims), and most schoolchildren attended the same 
secular public schools (and sometimes Catholic ones as well). Houphouët-
Boigny’s ideology of ecumenical harmony between the country’s religious 
traditions, though political at core as an instrument of co-option to achieve 
national cohesion where no religion dominated single-handedly, further 
strengthened this state of affairs. Kouassi-Datékro, a village in the East where 
Muslims and Christians helped each other build their religious centers, has long 
been heralded a symbol of Côte d’Ivoire’s “religious miracle”. Not that there was 
not any resentment on either side. Since the colonial era and with renewed 
acuteness since the ivoirité crisis, Christians nurtured a besieged complex 
whereby Islam was portrayed as a steamroller religion of invaders. Convinced 
that the colonial and postcolonial regimes favored Christianity at their expense, 
Muslims conversely developed a victimization complex. But if there were 
instances of social conflict involving members of both faiths, they were never 
ascribed to religion. This explains why the politically motivated attacks on 
mosques and imams and to a lesser extent on churches and priests after 
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October 2000 and again after September 2002 truly shocked and saddened 
many Ivorians. Contacts between imams and priests have continued anyhow.6 
Furthermore, there have been various experiences of inter-faith dialogue 
since the 1970s. Initiated by the Catholic Church upon the recommendations of 
the 1965 Second Vatican Council, these meetings concerned only a small elite of 
mostly urban European priests and laymen as well as young Muslim reformists, 
determined to inscribe the spirit of tolerance and social peace on the heart of 
their new interpretation of Islam. For their commitment to this dialogue, El Hadj 
Boubacar Sakho, a Muslim notability of Abidjan, was awarded a medal by Pope 
John Paul II in the mid-1990s and El Hadj Tidjane Ba, Côte d’Ivoire’s first mufti 
who was both a very influential reformist and a Tidjani, was invited to the Assisi 
ecumenical prayer days by the same pope in 1986.7 These irregular Christian-
Muslim contacts were important in the long run in that the new emerging Muslim 
leadership was influenced by the social and intellectual modus operandi of the 
Church, especially with regards to the centralized mode of communal 
organization, strategies of communication, the use of the French language, 
techniques of missionary activity and social welfare activism.8 In many ways, the 
Conseil National Islamique emulates for Islam the multifaceted role that the 
Church plays for Catholicism.  
In 1995, the country’s main Christian, Muslim and animist organizations 
also supported the initiative of a secular pro-democracy NGO called the Groupe 
d'Etudes et de Recherches sur la Démocratie et le Développement Economique 
et Social en Côte d’Ivoire (the Studies and Research Group on Democracy and 
Socio-Economic Development in Côte d’Ivoire or GERDDES-CI) by becoming 
founding members of a new Forum des Confessions Religieuses (Forum of 
Religious Bodies). Today led by Senior Evangelist Ediémou Blin Jacob of the 
Celestial Christian Church, the Forum has voiced religious leaders’ appeasing 
messages at times of political conflict and carried out an increasingly important 
function since September 2002 (see details below). 
 
 
3. Islam in the Legal Framework and Political Culture of the State 
 
3.1. Egalitarian legal framework but more sectarian realities 
 
 Following the French model, the Ivorian constitution, first adopted in 1960 
and revised in August 2000, declares the Republic “one and indivisible, secular, 
democratic and social”. As far as religions are concerned, all are recognized 
before the law and none can claim specific privileges from the State. Secular but 
not anti-religious, the State is committed to protect its citizens’ religious freedom 
and the free exercise of all Ivorian cults. Until March 2003, the administrative 
agency in charge of religious affairs and the guarantor of these principles was the 
Interior Ministry, when a Cults Ministry was created by the Gbagbo regime to 
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foster national reconciliation. To this day, Muslims have not complained of any 
political infringements on their basic religious freedom, including the freedom to 
convert to Islam. There has never been any Islamic party nor have there been 
attempts to create one.  
The differences between Ivorian and French conceptions of secularism 
are noteworthy, owing mostly to Houphouët’s conviction that religions had a 
decisive role to play in the attainment of national unity and socioeconomic 
progress – a rhetoric taken up again by all of his successors. Profoundly spiritual, 
eager to be seen as a kind of prophet, Houphouët placed his rule under God’s 
law. He advocated this divine tutelage not just in Christian but in broad 
ecumenical terms, in part to co-opt all religious parties. Muslims have always 
been laudatory supporters of this particular conception of State-religion relations. 
But their criticism of what they saw as the State’s non-avowed bias in favor of 
Christianity grew sharply in the 1980s. Despite the building of some mosques, 
the completion of the Marian sanctuary, the Saint Paul Cathedral (both in 
Abidjan) and the Yamoussoukro basilica made the disproportion in financial 
investments between the country’s main religions all too obvious. On these 
occasions, Houphouët orchestrated three visits of the Pope in less than ten 
years. Some observers also wondered if the creation of two new bishoprics in the 
almost entirely Islamized towns of Bondoukou and Odienné, respectively in 1988 
and 1995, was not the sign of a political willingness to promote Christianity from 
above. Spokesman of Muslims’ frustrations, the very influential reformist El Hadj 
Aboubacar Fofana asked in 1990: “Is the State still secular or it is choosing a 
religion?”.9 The democratic turmoil and the appointment of Alassane Dramane 
Ouattara as Prime Minister – the highest position ever reached until then by a 
Dioula and a (secular) Muslim – temporarily appeased those doubts. But 
critiques rose again after 1994 and became blatant denunciations under Gbagbo, 
who made it no secret that he was placing his rule under the law of Jesus Christ. 
Constitutionally impartial as regards religions, the newly independent 
Ivorian State de jure favored egalitarianism in other ways as well. To harmonize 
the legal system – in the hope that it would accelerate the nation’s 
modernization, a main target of the 1960s-70s development policies – a unified 
national positive law replaced the pre-existing customary and religious traditions, 
disregarded as burdens of the past. Among other actions, a new civil and family 
code became effective in 1964 (slightly revised in 1983), banning the caste 
system, the matrilineal filiation system, the customary heritage system, the dowry 
system, and polygamy. While this code was in tune with Christian teachings, it 
violated some fundamental animist and Islamic prescriptions. True to say, the 
State never took any punitive steps to enforce these regulations. Polygamy, for 
instance, was still practiced by 22.6% of married men nationwide in 1988.10 What 
these legal measures revealed nonetheless was the partisanship of the State in 
favor of a Westernized model of civilization and modernity, bearer of potentially 
 7
universal and neutral principles but also marked by secularized Christian values 
and culture.  
That is how the 1964 calendar officializing public holidays roughly 
renewed the one already in place since the colonial era, but added a few national 
holidays: most official holidays were those of Christians. Until the 1993 revisions 
of this calendar and the 1995 reforms of the work code, the main Islamic holidays 
were public only for Muslims: the civil service and public schools remained open 
on those days. Since then, Lailat al-Qadr and the Prophet’s birthday (Mawlid al-
Nabi) have been added to the list of national public holidays, as well as the days 
following Tabaski (Id al-Adha) and Ramadan (Id al-Fitr) when the holiday falls on 
a Sunday. When the curriculum for public education was discussed in the 1960s, 
Houphouët refused to include Arabic to the list of foreign languages offered at 
middle and high school levels (but Latin was an option). When the proposition 
was voiced again by the Conseil National Islamique in the mid-1990s, it provoked 
a general outcry on grounds that the Muslim federation was trying to Islamize 
Côte d’Ivoire. Conversely, since 1965, Quranic schools are required to teach 
French to be officially authorized (in practice, few of them did; many were not 
recognized anyway). This is not to say that the State was anti-Islamic, for it was 
not in the least. But it was not as neutral as it pretended to be. Without being 
rejected from the State, Islam and Muslims were relegated to a subaltern, 
marginal position. 
  
3.2. Houphouët’s and his successors’ approach towards Muslims and the 
legacy of a political culture of Muslim subservience 
 
Though a devout Catholic, President Houphouët-Boigny developed close 
albeit ambiguous relations with Muslims and Islam. Rumors circulated that his 
father was a Muslim from Mali (he never either confirmed or denied the 
information). His first wife was a pious Muslim of mixed Akan and Senegalese 
parentage and one of his last mistresses was also a Muslim, in whose memory 
he built the prominent Riviera Golf mosque in Abidjan. He cultivated lasting 
spiritual friendships with renowned Sufi marabouts such as Yacouba Sylla or 
Amadou Hampaté Bâ and was captivated by traditional Islam’s mysticism. In his 
political journey at the beginning of the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain 
(RDA), many of his friends and collaborators were Muslim and Dioula and he 
forged a unique alliance with the family of the Senoufo patriarch Gbon Coulibaly 
of Korhogo, an important town in the North of the country. All these relations 
were politicized to a large extent as they served his hegemonic exchange 
strategy. But the sentimentality with which Houphouët spoke of these Muslim 
intimacies explains in part why the vast majority of Ivorian Muslims fondly liked 
the person and never ceased to support the president even though at the same 
time he deliberately albeit surreptitiously relegated them to a position of political 
subservience. 
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For even though Houphouët fully acknowledged the contribution of 
Muslims, Dioula and Northerners (categories often amalgamated, not entirely 
rightly) to the social and especially economic development of the nation – he 
even reminded them of their duty to push the country’s growth always further – 
he categorically denied them any political autonomy. Since Houphouët saw 
himself as the ultimate defender of Muslims’ interests, no one was ever allowed 
to come between him and the Muslim community. To keep the community in line, 
he used mostly two strategies: a strategy of co-option, both financial and 
clientelist, and a strategy of control, ranging from discrete surveillance to outright 
repression. Houphouët ruled with money and gave many and generous gifts to 
Muslims: he built mosques, sent checks to imams, imams to Mecca and sugar for 
Ramadan. To second him, he appointed Mamadou Coulibaly, one of the barons 
of his regime, as the informal “Big Man” of Muslims. The latter was more a 
politician than a Muslim and more dedicated to his mentor and the ruling Parti 
Démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) than to solving Muslims’ problems. As 
long as Muslims accepted Houphouët’s gifts and political tutelage, their relations 
with the political authorities were uneventful. But whenever any Muslim hinted a 
critique at the existing order or rose to a position of threatening dominance, 
repression followed on grounds of sedition. Even Mamadou Coulibaly was once 
called to order after his return from his first pilgrimage in 1973. His religious 
contacts with Saudi dignitaries and representatives of pan-Islamic agencies had 
angered Houphouët. Indeed, so acute was the President’s suspicion of Arab-
Islamic countries exporting religious ideologies that until the year of his death, 
Côte d’Ivoire did not establish diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia (and when it 
did in 1993, Saudis were not allowed to open an embassy in Abidjan for another 
nine years). In the mid-1980s, Houphouët vetoed several transfers of funds from 
pan-Islamic agencies to Ivorian Muslim communities and associations. With 
Kadhafi’s tours south of the Sahara in the period, foreign-sponsored Islamic 
threats were systematically instrumentalized to bridle or undo Muslim leaders 
and activities.  
Houphouët thus created a now firmly rooted political culture in Côte 
d’Ivoire whereby State authorities are willing to express deference, even 
gratitude to Muslims (and Dioula and Northerners) as long as they refrain from 
making any political claim of their own. If the Muslim constituency appears to 
dissociate itself from the Head of State or ruling party, it can be accused of all ills, 
including treason to the nation, and repressed.  
Though Muslims are incomparably freer to express and defend 
themselves since democracy’s return in 1990 and the creation of the CNI in 
1993, it remains striking how all of Houphouët’s successors have continued, in 
different ways and with diverging results, some of Houphouët’s practices in 
relation to Muslims. The constitutional heir, Henri Konan Bedié, capitalized on his 
family relations with Muslims in Daoukro and heavily invested in the building of 
mosques, including the new monumental Plateau mosque in Abidjan (not yet 
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completed in 2005). He appointed Balla Keita and Moustapha Diaby Koweit as 
his political Muslim “Big Men”. General Robert Guei, who overthrew Bédié in a 
coup d’Etat in 1999, built, among other mosques, the Akouedo military camp. In 
his pre-electoral campaign in June 2000, he distributed Qurans in all four corners 
of the country. Laurent Gbagbo and his Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI) courted 
Muslims even more aggressively than did Alassane Ouattara in the mid-1990s. 
Once in power, he allowed Saudis to open an embassy in Abidjan and initiated 
Côte d’Ivoire’s membership to the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), 
the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), and the Islamic Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (ISESCO)11 (this had not even been a Muslim claim: it falls 
within Gbagbo’s pragmatic search for new donors at a time when Western 
countries and institutions were withholding their financial support). Gbagbo also 
followed Houphouët’s strategy of matrimonial alliances by taking a Muslim Dioula 
from the North, Nady Bamba, as his second quasi-official wife.12  
On the repressive side, Bedié developed the ivoirité ideology to eliminate 
his most serious opponent, Alassane Ouattara of the Rassemblement des 
Républicains (RDR). Bedié deprived many Muslim Dioula – equated with 
foreigners – of their citizenship rights in this process and directed his policy also 
against many foreigners, mostly Muslim Burkinabe. Determined at first to 
reconcile the divided nation and bury the hatched with Muslims, Guei later allied 
himself to Gbagbo and pro-ivoirité Bishop Bernard Agré of the Catholic Church to 
prevent the presidency from falling into non-Christian hands. Guei would become 
president and Gbagbo his Prime Minister: Agré had them swear the secret 
agreement on the Bible.13 After Gbagbo betrayed Guei, his supporters 
intimidated and murdered presumed pro-RDR Dioula and Muslim supporters in 
the post-electoral violence of October 2000. For the first time in Ivorian history, 
among other incidents that also affected non-Muslims, national politics resulted in 
the devastation of mosques, the burning of Qurans and the mauling of imams. 
Pro-FPI gendarmes (policemen) were also behind a mass grave of 57 Dioula 
bodies found in the Abidjan neighborhood of Yopougon.14 
 
 
4. From a Religion of “Old Dioula Traders” to that of “Young Educated 
Executives”: Muslim Leaders and their Islamic Interpretations in 
Historical Perspective 
 
Islam’s normative and universal tenets have always been realized 
differently in various historical and geographical contexts or among diverse 
societal groups at/in any given time or place: Côte d’Ivoire is no exception.15 
Whatever external influences were at play, Ivorian Muslims always elaborated 
and reworked their own local interpretations of Islam and formed multiple 
religious communities, sometimes converging, often compartmentalized or 
divided. What follows is a diachronic overview of the country’s main Muslim 
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collectivities and their specific conceptions of Islam, with a focus on the social 
and religious dimensions of both. The next section surveys their collective and 
differentiated approaches to politics in general and the Ivorian State in particular. 
 
4.1. “Traditional” Islam: from relative stagnation to Sufi revivalism16 
 
Sufi brotherhoods (tariqa) have only had a peripheral influence on the 
collective lives of Muslims in the Ivorian region. The Tijaniyya and the Qadiriyya 
have been present since at least the 19th century in the northern savanna but 
their influence has been confined to the spiritual lives of individual believers, 
generally learned men of a certain age. None ever had the centralized hierarchy 
and close-knit community that made them such powerful socioeconomic and 
political organizations in Senegal or Northern Nigeria.17 
Even without tariqas, “traditional” Islam has long been a pervasive 
influence on Muslims’ daily lives, particularly as regards prayers, Ramadan, life 
cycle ceremonies and children’s education. A religion of traders living as 
minorities in non-Muslim contexts, Dioula Islamic culture in its local variants was 
generally infused by pragmatism and, until the mid-20th century, evolved away 
from the theologians’ disputes that periodically divided Muslims in Sudano-
Sahelian regions. But though the destruction of Kong by Samori Touré’s armies 
in 1897 inflicted a severe blow to local Islamic learning, Dioula Islam was not as 
atonic as some colonial observers portrayed it. In the inter-war period, in the 
Muslim quarters or dioulabougous of the emerging urban centers of the South, 
where Dioulas of various regional origins mixed with new converts, less parochial 
and more standardized or “orthodox” practices of and discourses on Islam 
gradually emerged.18  
The fact remains that in the context of the fast modernizing Ivorian society 
of the later half of the 20th century, particularly in towns and among the young 
and modernly educated, traditional Islam gradually lost its appeal. Traditional 
education, consisting of root memorization of the Quran in Arabic, was seen as 
inadequate at best. Friday sermons of traditionalist imams were mostly ritualistic 
– following a determined set of rules and religious topics, leaving aside any 
contemporary issue of a social or political nature – and unconcerned with 
pedagogy. Arabic, the language of sermons, was understood only by a tiny 
minority. A growing number of Muslims thus came to see Islam as an archaism of 
the past, unable to challenge modernity, in consonance with the prejudices of 
Ivorian public opinion at the time.  
Yet traditional Islamic culture survived: not only did it not disappear with 
the emergence of new forms of Islam, but its relevance in social contexts of 
partial or failed modernization could also be reasserted. As in the past, it 
continues to play an important role in the lives of many Muslims, particularly in 
the North, in the countryside and in less privileged city quarters. The popularity of 
the Abidjan-based traditionalist leader Cheikh Azoumana Konaté, who died in 
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September 2005 while serving as Côte d’Ivoire “Grand Cheikh of Ivorian imams” 
(a function created by a CNI sister association in 1996) was evidence that 
traditional Islam is still a powerful reference point in the face of rapid change and 
adversity.19  
What is more, in the past 15-20 years, owing in part to reformist 
influences, Sufi Islam has undergone a renewal process, both in terms of 
organization with the adoption of modern means of community management and 
communication, and in terms of membership. New Sufi leaders such as Cheikh 
Moustapha Sonta, self-proclaimed Khalifa of Tidjanis in Côte d’Ivoire, are behind 
the return of a significant number of young, educated and executive Muslims to 
mystical Islam. As in the past though, the trend reveals individual spiritual 
aspirations for self-improvement rather than collective commitments for action in 
the public sphere. Most new Sufis, particularly those who maintain reformist 
ideas (discrediting in the process antagonistic definitions of both Islamic paths) 
keep their Sufi identity private. Unbeknownst to many, some prominent reformist 
imams in Abidjan are also Sufis. 
 
4.2. “Wahhabi” or “Sunni” Islam: religious radicalism and social conservatism20 
 
Wahhabi Islam is a scripturalist interpretation of the Quran and Hadiths, 
loosely inspired by the teachings of the 18th century Arab theologian Muhammad 
Ibn Abd al-Wahhab; hence its name, first used by French colonials, but criticized 
as inappropriate by Ivorian “Wahhabis”, who favored first the label “Orthodox”, 
then “Sunni”. Owing to Wahhabis’ special way of crossing their arms during 
prayer, they have also been called “bras croisés” (“crossed arms”). Additional 
distinctive features include the tchador-like black veils for women and short 
trousers and beards for men.  
Influential albeit minority, the Wahhabi movement emerged in the 1950s in 
Bouaké and Bamako, in the French Sudan, when a young generation of pilgrims 
and students (many of whom were Guineans) returned from Mecca, and in the 
prestigious Al-Azhar University in Cairo. With new reformed Islamic schools or 
madrasas and the Dakar-based Union Culturelle Musulmane (Muslim Cultural 
Union or UCM), the movement gained ground throughout Côte d’Ivoire and 
French-speaking West Africa. While preaching a return to the pristine Islam of its 
origins, Wahhabis also denounced elements of the local cultural heritage as non-
Islamic or bid’a (innovation). Attacks were at their most virulent against Sufi 
brotherhoods and the corporation of marabouts, depicted as vile social parasites 
and henchmen of colonial authorities. This led to tensions and open conflicts with 
traditionalists. Beneath those disputes were also socioeconomic differences. 
Wahhabis tended to be wealthy and nouveaux riches and they discredited 
marriage, funeral and other traditional customary spending in favor of rationalized 
investment.21 
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Likewise madrasas not only provided their children with basic religious 
instruction but also with the fundamentals of literacy and algebra to succeed in 
commerce in the modern age. 
After independence, the Wahhabi movement lost momentum in Côte 
d’Ivoire. Many Guinean Wahhabi leaders returned home and the Wahhabis who 
stayed behind stopped sending their children to study in the Arab world, 
beheading their elite in the long run. Small communities with significant numbers 
of new converts to Islam formed in the Ivorian South. Unlike the Bouaké elite, 
many of their members were poor and illiterate. If Saudi money ever reached 
them, it was inconsequential.  
In the early 1970s, after more than a decade of Houphouëtist authoritarian 
rule in the name of national unity, timid reforms allowed for the discrete public 
expression of religious and other (non-political) differences. Wahhabis were 
prompt to seize the opportunity, building their own mosques to pray separately 
from traditionalists, which spurred new tensions and conflicts. Calling upon the 
State to defend their right to religious freedom, Wahhabis created the Association 
des Musulmans Orthodoxes de Côte d’Ivoire (Association of Orthodox Muslims 
of Côte d’Ivoire or AMOCI) in 1976, which in the long run contributed to 
appeasing the situation. Separatism between Wahhabi and non-Wahhabi 
communities became the norm. In 1977, Wahhabis inaugurated their first large 
mosque in Abidjan, in the neighborhood of Bracodi Bar in Adjamé.  
Soon after, in 1981, an internal dispute involving the Bracodi mosque’s 
imam revealed extreme tensions between the local wealthier, educated elite on 
the one hand and the enlarging less privileged majority – with many foreign 
migrants – on the other. The dispute degenerated to such a point that despite the 
Interior Ministry’s good offices, the AMOCI was suspended and the mosque 
closed. The conflict was resolved in 1986 but it was not until 1994 that the 
AMOCI reconstituted itself as the AMSCI, changing the epithet “Orthodox” for 
“Sunni”. In the meantime, Bouaké, the historical center of Wahhabism, regained 
importance and Abidjan witnessed a slow movement of reconciliation between 
Sunnis and other Muslims, made easier by the rise of a new generation of 
modernist reformists (see details below). Though the two groups share a more 
normative interpretation of religion, a concern for reforming and democratizing 
Islamic education, the use of local languages for this purpose and a pro-active 
promotion of a new kind of Muslim identity, Wahhabis also differ from the more 
modern-minded reformists by their social conservatism especially vis-à-vis 
women, their Arabized culture and their antagonism towards Islamic pluralism.  
 Since the late 1990s, Abidjan and particularly the Cocody campus of the 
University of Abidjan have witnessed a resurgence of Sunni (now also called 
Salafi) discourses and activities. Young theologians trained in Saudi Arabia or 
Kuwait and anglophone Cocody students from Northern Nigeria have recruited 
followers, including young educated women, some of whom were expelled from 
university after they refused to identify themselves by showing their face before 
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exams. For the first time, tensions arose with other reformist groups, criticized as 
liberal renovators. For instance, the prayer nights organized on campus every 
year by an association of Muslim students before exam time were devaluated as 
bid’a, or non-Islamic innovation. Under the young wing’s influence, the AMSCI 
moved out of the CNI, of which it had been a founding member in 1993. In 
August 2005, it put in place its own Sunni Council of imams. It is difficult to 
answer the question of how many followers the AMSCI has today as really no 
data exists on the AMSCI and wahhabi following. It can be stated, however, that 
the movement has clearly remained a minority, albeit a non-negligible one.22 
 
4.3. Reformist Islam: the middle and upper classes’ struggle to reconcile Islam 
and modernity 
 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the “Ivorian economic miracle” paid for 
generalized access to the official school system with a secular and Western-
oriented curriculum taught in French and national degrees leading to liberal 
professions and executive positions in the public and private formal sectors. For 
a small but enlarging group of Muslims, this was a formidable tool of social 
mobility. The phenomenon was particularly marked in the South, where 
economic activities were concentrated (by contrast, the savanna and northern 
neighboring countries fell into relative under-development) and in towns, most 
notably Abidjan, which monopolized the country’s best high schools and 
institutes of higher education. Over time, a new middle and upper class of 
Westernized Muslims emerged. It was from their ranks that a new group of 
reformist Muslims arose in the early 1970s who were all French-speaking young 
men and women educated in official non-Islamic schools, secular or Christian.  
These young Muslims were disenchanted by Marxist ideologies and the 
then pervasive materialism of Ivorian society but also ill at ease with the 
traditional Islamic heritage that their parents had transmitted to them somewhat 
passively. In their quest for a meaningful faith that could reconcile spirituality and 
modernity, they were decisively guided by three theologians trained in the Arab 
world: the Tidjani Cheikh Tidjane Ba (d. in 2001), the Wahhabi Mohamed Lamine 
Kaba and the visionary reformist Aboubacar Fofana, maybe the most influential 
Ivorian Muslim leader in the later half of the 20th century. Dioula- and Arabic-
speakers, all three gradually became fluent in French to reach this particular 
audience. Their initial hope had been to mobilize madrasa students but those did 
not respond to the ambitious task of rethinking the interface between Islam and 
modernity and the place and role of Muslims in the Ivorian context. Part of the 
explanation is that they did not collectively question their Islam, were not an 
integral part of modern society and were not conversant with its critical and 
dialectical modes of reasoning. Together, fortified by their triple African, Islamic 
and Western culture, the French-speaking Muslim youth and the three Arabized 
theologians gradually elaborated a new interpretation of Islam. Reformist Islam 
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was an orthodox but contextualized interpretation of the dogma, designed to give 
an Islamic response to the changing needs and aspirations of contemporary 
Ivorian Muslim society and more specifically the Muslim middle and upper class. 
Among other aspects, reformists advocated the community’s unity within 
absolute respect for the pluralism of Islamic expressions (Ahmadiyya excepted), 
unflinching tolerance for other religions, including African traditional religions, a 
strict separation between Islam and issues of ethnicity or nationality, and a liberal 
approach towards Muslim women and gender relations.  
To promote these views, reformists put in place innovative organizations 
and activities. The first national reformist association was the Association des 
Elèves et Etudiants Musulmans de Côte d’Ivoire (Muslim Students Association of 
Côte d’Ivoire or AEEMCI). First launched in 1972, a political freeze delayed its 
official recognition until 1979. Its main activity remains a yearly two-week seminar 
designed to improve students’ knowledge of their religion and the Islamic 
sociability of these young men and women coming from all four corners of the 
country to a new host town every summer. Tidjane Ba, Mohamed Lamine Kaba 
and Aboubacar Fofana were their indefatigable teachers and advisers, not only 
attending the seminars but also animating weekly discussions in Abidjan and 
traveling widely to meet AEEMCI students in their localities. In 1977, through the 
agency of a reformist journalist, they contributed to a new weekly Islamic 
program on national television, whose rational pedagogy in French was attractive 
to many and even triggered a wave of conversions.  
Until the mid-1980s, most Westernized Muslim adults with executive 
positions in the public or private sector were reluctant to join the reformist 
movement despite its targeted efforts to recruit them. The reasons were in part 
feelings of inferiority rooted in the idea that Islam was backward and fears that 
commitment to Islam would endanger their careers (the memory of the 1960s 
“false plots” which allowed Houphouët to repress many members of the Dioula 
political intelligentsia was still alive23). The situation gradually changed after the 
1982 creation of the Communauté Musulmane de la Riviera (Riviera Muslim 
Community or CMR; Riviera is a posh residential neighborhood in the Cocody 
district). The founders were a small group of young Muslim executives, some of 
whom had been AEEMCI leaders and who were all dedicated to the three 
theologians. Informal on purpose to avoid any political harnessing and internal 
competition, the CMR was a fertile ground for further intense intellectual debates 
and innovative experiments in community management.  
Out of the AEEMCI, the CMR and the particular influence of Aboubacar 
Fofana, several new associations were created which targeted Muslim society’s 
various socioeconomic groups and their common needs. Three associations 
were put in place in 1988: the Conseil Supérieur des Imams (Supreme Council of 
Imams or COSIM, officially recognized in 1991), which brought together for the 
first time traditionalist, Wahhabi, reformist and other imams; the Association des 
Jeunes Musulmans de Côte d’Ivoire (Young Muslim Association of Côte d’Ivoire 
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or AJMCI, recognized in 1992), for all young Muslims who were not or no longer 
in school; and the Ligue Islamique des Prédicateurs de Côte d’Ivoire (Islamic 
League of Muslim Preachers of Côte d’Ivoire or LIPCI, recognized in 1991), for 
preachers of all sectarian tendencies to coordinate their educative and 
missionary activities. After democracy’s return in 1990, additional organizations 
were formed, among them were: the Secours Médical Islamique (Islamic Medical 
Relief or SEMI), the Association des Femmes Musulmanes de Côte d’Ivoire 
(Muslim Women’s Association of Côte d’Ivoire or AFMCI) and the Conseil 
National pour l’Organisation du Pèlerinage à la Mecque (National Council for the 
Organization of the Pilgrimage to Mecca or CNOPM). The process of communal 
reoganisation culminated in the creation of the CNI federation in 1993, supported 
by all reformist associations, the Wahhabi national organ and 45 local Muslim 
associations and communities (500 in 2005). Koudouss Idriss Koné, barely 
known at the time, was elected president, after Aboubacar Fofana had declined 
the position so as to protect the CNI from the political authorities’ acute distrust of 
his own person. 
The CNI was then challenging the other existing Islamic federation, the 
Conseil Supérieur Islamique (Supreme Islamic Council or CSI). Established 
during the time of the oil boom in 1979 upon the initiative of foreign 
representatives of the Muslim World League, the CSI’s main objective had been 
to coordinate sporadic local requests for financial assistance with the approval of 
the Ivorian State. But the CSI – and similar competing Islamic associations of the 
time – quickly became the springboard for ambitious Muslim civil servants to 
claim their share of political power and lobby for funds. For a short decade, these 
aspirations matched Houphouët’s strategy to co-opt Muslim leaders and 
redistribute money. Yet when Ivorian-Arab relations turned sour by the late 
1980s, the CSI was quickly silenced and reduced to an empty shell. Moustapha 
Diaby Koweit, a newcomer without religious credentials, resuscitated the ghost 
federation in 1991 with the backing of the then ”Big Man“ of Muslims, Lazéni 
Coulibaly, and a major grant from the Dakar venue of the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference. As before, the CSI under Diaby Koweit was all about 
personal ambitions, money and PDCI power. In 1995, Diaby Koweit was even 
elected MP of the northern town of Samatiguila and served as Henri Konan 
Bedié’s religious advisor (he consequently had to flee the country after the 1999 
coup d’Etat). CSI and CNI were thus completely at odds: indeed, the latter had 
been created in part because of the reformists’ outrage at Koweit’s handling of 
Muslim matters. Koweit tried in vain to convince the government and foreign 
media that the CNI was a hotbed of radical Islamists. Unlike the CNI, the CSI 
had, in reality, virtually no influence at grassroots level.24 Koweit’s reappearance 
as a presidential candidate for the 2005 national election seems little more than a 
masquerade. 
In its early years, the CNI attracted enormous and widespread enthusiasm 
and support from the Muslim population. The ivoirité crisis also contributed to 
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many Dioula, northerners’ and foreigners’ awareness of their Muslim identity. 
Though the CNI was in no way a by-product of post-Houphouëtist Ivorian politics, 
these politics reinforced Muslims’ allegiance to the CNI. Popular expectations of 
the CNI were so high that a decade later, disenchantment was not absent. For 
instance, the CNI leadership is now criticized for failing to renew itself and 
democratize. Nonetheless, the CNI remains to this day the most representative 
and influential of all competing Islamic federations, several of which have been 
created since the late 1990s but remain marginal. In 1996, the editor-in-chief of 
the Ivorian daily Le Jour estimated that only about ten mosques adhered to the 
CSI nationwide, the rest following the CNI. In 2005, CSI’s influence was even 
more negligible, but with CNI’s power of attraction having weakened and new, 
competing federations having been created, its quasi-monopolistic influence has 
also eroded.  
 
 
5. Muslims’ Approach Towards the Ivorian State: Old and New 
Traditions of Accommodation 
 
Since independence, Muslims have adopted a remarkably stable and 
homogeneous position vis-à-vis the Ivorian State (for further details on this, see 
the section below on the relations with the Arab-Islamic world). Whatever their 
differences and the political circumstances, they all advocated and practiced 
accommodation, which can be defined as constructive engagement towards the 
State, of which Muslims felt an integral part. To use Quranic terminology, 
Muslims’ collective choice was against hijra (exile, disengagement) and jihad of 
the sword (violent rejection of the State) in favor of taqiyya (accommodation). If 
submission was made easier by Houphouët’s fraternal alliance with Muslims and 
was at times constrained by the threat or reality of repression, accommodation 
was also a lasting tradition deeply rooted in Dioula society. Minority merchant 
Dioula communities living among majority non-Muslim societies have long 
followed the Suwari tradition of West African Islam, named after the 15th century 
Malian scholar El Hadj Salim Suwari. This tradition is characterized by a 
separation of religion and politics. It offers an apolitical interpretation of Islam, 
legitimizing religious pluralism and non-Islamic rule. Suwari Islam thus unites 
Muslims to keep their distance from and avoid confronting political power in order 
to better focus on religious education and spirituality. As in the pre-colonial and 
colonial periods, Muslims accommodated to the postcolonial State, last in a long 
line of “infidel” rulers. Traditionalists have probably remained the most politically 
submissive of all Ivorian Muslims. 
If Muslims accepted the nation-State with much enthusiasm, it was also 
out of pragmatism. More immersed in trade and informal activities than inclined 
towards politics, Dioulas and foreigners alike supported Houphouët’s regime 
because it secured the kind of peace and stability that was propitious to their 
 17
commercial and religious affairs. Likewise, they backed Houphouët’s policy that 
“the land belongs to whoever cultivates it”, against the conviction of southern 
autochthons that it was inalienably theirs and that non-natives were mere 
colonialists. Muslims defended their president even in the midst of the democratic 
turmoil in 1990, when the Catholic Church voiced cautious criticism at the 
government’s handling of civic liberties. 
After Houphouët’s death, Ivorian Muslims continued to be legalistic, 
republican and patriotic. Wahhabis and reformists always maintained that good 
Muslims ought to be good citizens, good workers and good neighbors. The effort 
to re-Islamize Muslim society was presented as a contribution towards the re-
moralization of society at large; the drive to unite Muslims was part of the broader 
nation-building process; the endeavor to reform Islam also meant that Muslims 
would be better integrated into Côte d’Ivoire’s modern political economy; and 
reformists’ insistence on religious tolerance clearly aimed at consolidating the 
country’s social peace. Muslim leaders were never anti-authoritarian or against 
the State. As a matter of fact, whenever national cohesion and the State’s 
stability appeared threatened, they made public calls for appeasement, often in 
partnership with their Christian counterparts, as happened in 1995, 2000 and 
after September 2002.  
The creation of the CNI in 1993 inaugurated a partial reorientation of this 
tradition of accommodation. In the context of the broadening of democratic 
culture following the recognition of the freedoms of association and expression, 
the CNI claimed the right to express and defend Muslims’ interests and concerns 
in the public sphere. In other words, it emancipated itself and henceforward 
refused co-option, either clientelist or financial. The CNI had been the outcome of 
a long process to bring Islam out of its isolation in mosques and the ritualistic 
sphere to open up to the country’s social, cultural and political life. The younger, 
modern-educated CNI- and COSIM-affiliated imams thus took upon themselves 
to serve not only as religious leaders for their communities but also as sorts of 
public intellectuals for the nation at large. They resolved to dispense non-partisan 
advice on issues of public interest, particularly when they felt that the nation’s 
fate was at stake. In July 2000 for instance, on the eve of the referendum on the 
new constitution, the COSIM made a public statement against the proposed 
changes in the constitution, arguing that these would breed exclusion, division 
and conflict.25 In the context of the demographic enlargement of the Muslim 
population nationwide, the CNI also claimed for more Muslim/Dioula/Northerners’ 
participation in matters of the State. This demand stigmatized the enduring 
Houphouëtist political legacy of Muslim subservience and marginalization. The 
CNI itself is strictly apolitical and its leaders display a thorough abjuration of their 
right to be elected to positions of political authority in the name of the separation 
of religion and politics.26 But they call upon individual lay Muslims to respond to 
the challenge of their own social and political responsibility by militating for just 
causes in movements of their choice along with other Muslims and non-Muslims. 
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Overall, the CNI thus aims at serving as the focal point of an emerging Ivorian 
Islamic civil society.  
Because it was a novelty in Côte d’Ivoire that imams were taking stands of 
a political nature (a novelty that could also upset the established order) and 
because the creation of the CNI roughly coincided with Houphouët’s death and 
the birth of the RDR, voices were heard from the mid-1990s that vilified the CNI 
as a clique of fundamentalists bent on Islamizing the State. These were mere 
prejudices aimed at delegitimizing Muslim autonomization in the public sphere. 
Indeed, one of the main political struggles of the CNI remains to protect and 
enhance the separation between the State, the Church, and the mosque. Not 
only does the CNI accommodate to secularism (laïcité or laity), it has also 
become its most ardent advocate.27 This state of affairs is partly grounded in the 
reality of Houphouët’s religions-friendly conception of secularism and in the 
reformist elites’ conviction that laity is in the end the best political mode of 
management of religions in a context of rich cultural and spiritual pluralism. 
Secularism also allows Muslims to avoid politicizing divisions (fitna or communal 
scissions) and a loss of moral ideals (according to the view that politics are 
corrupting).  
As a result, Muslims in general and the CNI in particular never requested 
the de jure implementation of the Shari’a in the public sphere – the reality being 
that in spite of the Ivorian law’s prohibition of customary and other jurisprudence, 
the application of the Islamic civil code (particularly as regards marriage, divorce 
and inheritance) is de facto tolerated in the Muslim private sphere. In 2001, the 
CNI even established an Observatoire de la laïcité (Observatory of secularism) to 
promote the neutral and egalitarian application of secularism and condemn any 
infringement in actual practices. The Ivorian case is one among many showing 
that Islam, secularism and democracy are no oxymorons. Far from being radical, 
the CNI is actually not devoid of a certain conservatism in that it aims at 
contributing to the safeguarding of the State’s institutions and principles. Today 
as in the past, Islam thus remains a stabilizing factor of the State in Côte d’Ivoire.  
 
 
6. Islam within Society: Education and Social Welfare Activism 
 
6.1. Education and the Muslim media  
Islamic education – at home, at school, in the community – has always 
been a priority for Ivorian Muslims, however differentiated their epistemological 
views of the subject might have been. Despite criticism of a functionalist nature, 
traditional Quranic schools continue to play an important role in the safekeeping 
of Muslim identity and the social cohesion of many local communities, particularly 
outside the main cities. In these traditional Quranic schools children gather 
around a teacher, often on the floor, to memorize the Quran in Arabic by heart 
with the help of washable tablets. Quranic teachers have also adapted to the 
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circumstances. Wherever large numbers of Muslim children are enrolled in 
secular or Christian schools (the latter being reputed among the country’s best), 
they offer Islamic classes in late afternoons and during holidays. Since the 
pioneer initiatives of the Wahhabi movement and the UCM in the 1950s, 
reformed Islamic schools or madrasa (where children are taught the 
fundamentals of religion along with secular topics, Arabic and sometimes French, 
in a Western-style classroom setup) are found in most Ivorian towns.28 The bulk 
of the country’s best madrasa are in Bouaké: one of them is the Dar al-Hadith. 
Built by a wealthy local entrepreneur, the Williamsville Cultural Islamic Center 
was Abidjan’s largest and most influential madrasa for a short decade 
(approx.1976-84) but it lost its prominence after the departure of its director, the 
reformist theologian Mohammed Lamine Kaba.  
From the 1980s on, the new generation of reformists gave discouraging 
reviews of both Quranic schools and madrasa’s general situation in Côte d’Ivoire. 
Many of these schools’ problems were internal. With no public subsidies and very 
limited foreign assistance – owing mostly to Ivorian Muslims’ lack of lobbying 
savoir-faire and Houphouët’s reluctance to let Arab-Islamic money in but also, 
not uncommonly, to parents’ difficulties and even reluctance to pay for their 
children’s education – these schools lacked basic amenities. Without clear 
recruitment policies, some Islamic teachers were below standard levels. Others 
were disaffected by their poor pay and had to rely on another occupation on the 
side. General lack of coordination prevented those schools from tackling 
important issues, such as the lack of appropriate textbooks. Other problems were 
of a politico-administrative nature. With few recent exceptions, Islamic schools 
come under the Interior and not the Education Ministry, because, unlike most 
Christian schools, they do not teach the national curriculum in French. 
Consequently, their degrees are not officially recognized. In practice, even 
Islamic students with a knowledge of French and secular topics were often (but 
not always) prevented from taking the national tests to get an equivalent rating of 
their degree. This general problem had been a major struggle of the UCM and 
the 1976 Association des Enseignants Coraniques (Quranic Teachers’ 
Association or AEC, now ASSOENCOCI), to no avail. Islamic school leavers 
were thus prevented from entering the formal sector’s job market and confined to 
precarious informal activities and oftentimes unemployment. Feelings of 
inferiority vis-à-vis Western-educated students and resentment at the kind of 
education they received were especially marked among madrasa students. 
According to various reformist reports, a regretful result was that a majority of 
juvenile offenders and drug addicts in a city like Abidjan were former madrasa 
students.29 This observation notwithstanding, there are also madrasas of good 
standing and they collectively continue to attract enrollment especially when 
students are not fluent in French, when they are too old for their school level to 
be admitted into the public system, or when their parents are attached to 
religious education.  
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To overcome this predicament, since the late 1980s, reformists 
experimented with a new kind of Islamic school following the Christian model. 
The “conventional confessional Islamic school” adopts the official curriculum and 
French as the only language of instruction. Islamic and Arabic lessons are 
facultative and student recruitment is not limited to Muslims. In 1993, the CNI and 
the State signed a convention so that Islamic schools meeting those criteria 
would be recognized and subsidized. The first such “conventional” school was 
the Cissé Kamourou confessional elementary school of Gagnoa in 1987. One of 
the most recent ones is the 2004 Iqra school complex in the Yopougon 
neighborhood of Abidjan. Though promising in the eyes of many Muslims, these 
schools are still very much a minority nationwide. The CNI-affiliated Organisation 
des Etablissements d’Enseignement Confessionnel Islamique (Islamic Schools’ 
Organization or OEECI) has been established to follow up on these education 
issues. 
 Ivorian Muslims and particularly reformists have also designed innovative 
ways of teaching Islam outside of the classroom. Conferences, seminars, 
breakfast-, lunch-, or dinner-debates have been offered to the Muslim public 
since the late 1970s, along with Islamic programs on national radio and 
television. But all attempts to create an Islamic press have thus far failed, due to 
distribution shortcomings and financial hardships. Among the now extinct titles 
were the CMR-sponsored monthly magazine Allahou Akbar (1981-82 and 1989-
93) and the AEEMCI-sponsored monthly, later weekly newspaper Plume Libre 
(1991-95 and 2000-02), both in French. In November 2001, after many years of 
reformist lobbying, the Islamic FM Al-Bayane began broadcasting in Abidjan. 
Placed under the CNI’s general supervision, its director is Djiguiba Cissé, also 
imam of the Plateau. It offers religious and other non-political programs in 
French, Arabic, and many vernacular languages. In 2005, the radio organized a 
major fundraising operation to purchase a transmitter to expand the FM’s 
diffusion radius to approx. 150-200 kilometers from Abidjan. It was a major 
success, even non-Muslims gave donations: evidence that Al-Bayan has met a 
faithful urban audience and is contributing, however modestly, to redress Islam’s 
traditionally negative public image.30 This notwithstanding, the weekly Islamic TV 
program mentioned above, which started in 1977, continues to this day as well.  
 
6.2. Social welfare activism: a new concern 
 
Until the early 1990s, mutual help among Muslims existed only at local 
and communal levels, on an ad hoc, personal and informal basis. When a need 
arose, money went directly from pocket to pocket without intermediaries or grand 
ideas of social redistribution. The Abidjan-based reformist associations were the 
first to make ardent calls for social welfare activism, understood as an effort to 
institutionalize Islamic solidarity for the benefit not only of Muslims but of the 
whole Ivorian society. With this, reformists clearly emulated the charitable actions 
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of the Catholic Church and no less clearly differed from Protestant neo-
Pentecostal churches with their emphasis on personal success and material 
wealth.  
Muslim students, women and executives began touring hospitals, 
orphanages, prisons and leper houses. Everywhere, they tried to create a prayer 
space or a mosque for the suffering, the destitute and the marginalized. They 
also sponsored blood and medicine donation days. A small number of 
organizations entirely devoted to Islamic welfare were established later. The 
Secours Médical Islamique (Medical Islamic Relief or SEMI) brings together all 
kinds of Muslim health professionals to provide medical assistance to those in 
need and attempt to improve the quality of care in the country. Among its regular 
activities are free vaccination and AIDS awareness campaigns. It also runs a 
handful of Islamic clinics in Abidjan and other towns. Founded as an association, 
the SEMI became an NGO in 1998 to be eligible for receiving funds from the 
Health Ministry and the World Health Organization. Two other Islamic NGOs, 
Action Justice and SOS Exclusion, are dedicated to fight all forms of exclusion, 
legal, political, ethnic, socioeconomic or otherwise. To avoid the political 
authorities’ line of sight at the height of the ivoirité crisis, both went underground 
after September 2002. Ibrahim Bredji, the imam of the Maca, Abidjan’s main 
prison, founded Le Nouvel Espoir (The New Hope), an NGO dedicated to the 
care of inmates and their families as well as prisoners’ social reintegration. 
Djiguiba Cissé, imam of the Plateau and director of Al-Bayane, created the 
Fondation Djigui, La Grande Espérance (Djigui Foundation, The Great 
Expectation) mostly to address the problem of AIDS and care for those living with 
the HIV but also to fight female genital mutilations and all forms of violence 
against women. Yet, in the absence of an established system to collect the zakat, 
Islamic social activities remain limited and as a matter of fact mostly centered 
around Abidjan. 
 
 
7. Islam, Transnationalism and Globalization 
 
7.1. Relations with the Arab-Islamic world 
 
 
 Unlike in Senegal, Mali or Burkina Faso, the 1970s’ oil booms were not 
followed by a massive influx of Arab-Islamic financial aid to Côte d’Ivoire. This 
state of affairs was in part rooted in Ivorian Muslim associations’ own internal 
weaknesses but more significantly in Houphouët’s enduring distrust of pan-
Islamic organizations, especially those linked to Saudi Arabia, Iran and Libya (for 
details, see above section on Houphouët’s approach towards Muslims). The level 
of international assistance sporadically received by local Muslim communities, 
Wahhabi included, was dwarfed in comparison to that secured by the Catholic 
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and Protestant churches. After the CNI was created, pan-Islamic organizations 
did not even recognize it until the very end of the 1990s. Even still in 1998, when 
the World Supreme Council for Mosques (an organization of the Muslim World 
League) agreed to host a congress in Abidjan, Diaby Koweit’s CSI patronized it 
(and all CNI-affiliated associations boycotted it; the congress was a media event 
at best).31  
Though no doubt a handicap to a certain extent, the scarcity of outside 
funds and logistical assistance nonetheless became a comparative advantage for 
Ivorian Muslims in the long run. Côte d’Ivoire was spared the Arab world’s 
religious and ideological divisions that have been imported along with 
petrodollars into other countries, as in neighboring Ghana. While Ivorian Muslims 
gained autonomy and creativity by counting on their own material and intellectual 
resources, they also belatedly succeeded in finding alternative non-Arab and 
non-Iranian para-governmental sources of funding and inspiration. For a few 
years in the late 1980s, the Communauté Musulmane de la Riviera (CMR) 
closely cooperated with the United States-based SAAR Foundation, named after 
a Saudi billionaire businessman. Among other outputs, reformist leaders were 
trained to new conceptions and techniques of da’wa (or missionary activity) and 
in Abidjan in 1991 they launched a yearly Séminaire International de Formation 
des Responsables d’Associations Musulmanes (International Training Seminar 
for Islamic Associations’ Leaders or SIFRAM), which soon gained regional 
respect. Ivorian and other West African Muslim children were also sent to Islamic 
summer camps in the USA for two consecutive years.32 Reformists later 
welcomed US-governmental policy of rapprochement with moderate Muslim 
actors. Even before September 11, a few had participated in the International 
Visitor Leadership Program of the US Department of State. When the failed coup 
occurred in September 2002, Aboubacar Fofana was in the United States, where 
he then remained living in forced exile. Contacts with Europeans intensified after 
the now famous Swiss Islamicist Tariq Ramadan associated himself with the 
CMR to launch the Colloque International des Musulmans de l’Espace 
Francophone (International Congress of Francophone Muslims or CIMEF).33 The 
first CIMEF was organized in Abidjan in 2000. Due to the political unrest, it was 
subsequently hosted in Cotonou, Benin, in 2002 and in Niamey, Niger, in 2004. 
 Relations between the Arab-Islamic world and both the Ivorian 
government and Ivorian Muslim associations have taken on a new dynamic after 
Ggagbo’s pragmatic opening up towards all potential sources of financial aid 
(also including China and Russia). But though reformists welcome new Saudi 
and Saudi-derived money, they are unwilling to renounce their locally adapted 
interpretation of Islam and more generally, their autonomy. Reformists have long 
expressed discomfort at the theological and social inflexibility that Ivorian 
graduates of Saudi universities tend to display after they return home. The CMR 
thus recently conceived a project to create an international institute for training 
imams in Abidjan. Though the money may come from the Islamic Development 
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Bank, education will abide by the principle of dialectics (meaning that not just one 
but all Islamic traditions and ulama’s viewpoints should be presented critically) 
and will include secular topics relating to the local African environment.34 
 The long-established Lebanese community of Côte d’Ivoire is mostly 
religiously passive on the public scene. One exception was the Shi’a movement 
initiated by Imam Cheikh Jaafar Sayegh (1929-96) in the neighborhood of 
Adjamé in Abidjan in the 1980s. Not unlike the Ahmadiyya mission, also based in 
Adjamé and directed by Pakistanis, it attracted mostly poor urban dwellers and 
migrants, often foreigners and women. In the past ten years, though, as Iran 
became more present in Côte d’Ivoire both on the religious and socioeconomic 
fronts, more African Sunnis have converted to Shi’a Islam, rising to positions of 
imamship in either non-denominational or new Shi’a mosques.35 It is difficult to 
measure the numbers of Shi’a adherents as the numbers given by Shi’a 
themselves are so obviously exaggerated that they seem useless. Shi’a are a 
very small minority but one whose influence is growing. Iran also financed the 
Mahad Ahlul-Beit Aleiyhem As-Salam Islamic University in Riviera-Palmeraie in 
Abidjan and is about to complete a new monumental religious complex in the 
neighborhood of Marcory, with a Shi’a mosque and a free clinic. So far, minority 
Shi’a have displayed a non-antagonistic public attitude towards the majority 
Muslim society. 
 
7.2. Ivorian Muslim attitude vis-à-vis radicalism 
 
Today, as in the past, Ivorian Muslims of all backgrounds unanimously 
maintain that their Islam is one of peace and ecumenical tolerance, poles apart 
from an Islam of armed conquest and state seizure: to the best of my knowledge, 
there has not been any discordant voice throughout Côte d’Ivoire in the 
postcolonial era. Even before September 11, the influential Tidjane Ba 
denounced the Talibans of Afghanistan as the “shame of Islam”, people “who did 
not understand a thing of our religion”.36 The day following 11 September 2001, 
the CNI addressed the local US embassy with a public statement of categorical 
condemnation of the violent acts and empathy for the victims’ families and the 
American nation.37 Professing that Muslims are not weak, but follow a religion of 
wisdom and the golden mean, the CNI systematically called for non-retaliation, 
moderation and patience in the face of all recent attacks against mosques, 
imams or Muslims in the country. Since Ivorian Muslims share with their leaders 
an abhorrence of violence, with few localized exceptions, they collectively 
complied. 
 
 
8. Uncivil State: Muslims and Violence since the Civil War in September 
2002 
 
 24
When the military coup failed on September 19, 2002, and rebel forces 
(later renamed “New Forces”) claimed the northern half of the country, Gbagbo’s 
regime and pro-governmental media presented the crisis as Côte d’Ivoire’s 
September 11. The rebellion was equated to religious terrorism and the civil war 
to the combat of fanatic Muslim Northerners against loyalist Christian 
Southerners. The born-again rhetoric of a battle between good and evil and 
President George W. Bush’s notion of an “axis of evil” were vigorously dealt out. 
But what were mere tactics to enflame the population and confer a supra-political 
dimension to the conflict did not achieve the expected results. The majority of the 
population was simply not duped. If anything, it soon became clear to most that 
the minority of neo-Pentecostal devotees moving in political circles were the 
implicated party with the most aggressive ideology. Even though a reading of the 
war through the sole coverage of some Ivorian media may lead to think 
otherwise, the population did not collectively embrace the hate ideology of 
Gbagbo’s regime (street actions were not spontaneous expressions of popular 
support; they were carefully choreographed from above with the help of militias). 
This is not to say that no tensions existed at the grassroots level. But these were 
mostly non-religious and rooted in the political crisis of the 1990s. In the 
countryside, tensions between autochthons and non-natives even predated the 
ivoirité era. In many ways, the Ivorian “civil” war is only a conflict of political chiefs 
fought primarily in Abidjan (since January 2003, the New Forces leaders – many 
of whom are not Muslims – have spent more time in Abidjan than in Bouaké) 
mostly for political reasons and, given the patrimonialist nature of the State, for 
economic ones as well. It is in no way a religious war. 
In the meantime, in the aftermath of September 2002, Muslims suffered 
both physical and moral violence at the hands of armed forces in the 
government-controlled South. Violence against Christians in the rebellious North 
also took place on a smaller scale.38 Security forces killed Muslim civilians, like in 
Daloa in October 2002. They routinely hit and harassed many more at 
roadblocks, even though the political economy of money extortion was neither 
purely ideological nor restricted to Muslims. When rumor had it that arms were 
hidden in mosques, some were violated. More seriously, until 2005, ten Muslim 
religious leaders were assassinated, most apparently by the Presidency-
controlled “death squadrons”. When imam Mahmoud Samassi of Abidjan was 
murdered in January 2003 – the third imam to die of a violent death in less than 
three months – the CNI organized a public funeral march in protest: it was the 
only time that Koudouss Idriss Koné raised an angry voice against the regime.39 
On all other occasions, the CNI issued public calls for appeasement and the 
return of peace, via the Al-Bayane radio station in particular. The CNI’s position 
has been to remain neutral vis-à-vis both the New Forces and the ruling regime, 
attracting discrete criticism for being too soft on Gbagbo. In any event, the war 
did not provoke a political radicalization of Islamic discourses. The new Sunni 
radicalism is exclusively directed towards rituals and non-political issues of 
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theology: as a matter of fact, Sunnis have publicly pledged to contribute to the 
return of peace in the country.40 
On a few occasions, accusations of Muslim extremism circulated. But like 
the CSI’s insinuations of the mid-1990s, these mostly emanated from Islamic 
organizations hostile to the CNI and now co-opted by Gbagbo’s regime. Some of 
these organizations were recent associations of Muslim converts, notably Bété, 
Gbagbo’s own ethnic group. For instance, when an assassination attempt 
against Cardinal Agré was reported in October 2003, Harrissou Fofana (a 
marginal figure by all accounts, associated to the unimportant organization Al 
Coran) publicly declared that the RDR had offered him and other Muslim leaders 
big money to kill unspecified targets; though he himself declined, others 
supposedly accepted. The Forum des Confessions Religieuses (Forum of 
Religious Bodies) quickly stepped in to discredit the allegation as malicious 
fabrication and remind Ivorians of all religious affiliations to remain vigilant in the 
face of rumors or actions meant to provoke their antagonism. Since the war 
began, the Forum has thus played a very important role, if only a symbolic one, 
in preventing an escalation of the conflict. Indeed, Muslim, Christian, and other 
religious leaders’ common public declarations and TV appearances favorably 
impressed the population. Most neo-Pentecostal churches were not members of 
the Forum because they contested its leader, Ediémou Blin Jacob. Following the 
anti-French violence of November 2004, a new transitory Collectif des 
Confessions Religieuses pour la Paix et la Réconciliation en Côte d’Ivoire 
(Religions Group for Peace and Reconciliation in Côte d’Ivoire) was established 
to incorporate them.41 
Even more important were the actions taken by the Collectif de la Société 
Civile pour la Paix (Civil Society Group for Peace in Côte d’Ivoire or CSCP). 
Founded on October 19, 2002, by Honoré Guié, GERDDES-CI’s president and 
the 1995 initiator of the Forum des Confessions Religieuses, the CSCP brings 
together civil society associations, human rights movements and religious 
organizations, including the Forum, to find ways and means to bring back a 
lasting peace to the country. Muslim and Christian CSCP representatives trained 
in the techniques of conflict resolution thus contributed to missions or peace 
caravans organized throughout the governmental zone by listening to and 
educating local communities. UNDP’s financial withdrawal has thus far prevented 
those missions from covering the North.42 
Muslim contacts between South and North have remained mostly fluid. 
Once, in January 2005, a communication problem resulted in the celebration of 
Tabaski on different days in each zone. But this was an exception: the religious 
authority of all CNI and COSIM-affiliated associations has not been openly 
challenged. Yet the experience of de facto autonomy in the North led to local 
initiatives. New Islamic associations were created at grassroots level, some 
entrepreneurs tried to organize air transportation for the hajj directly from Bouaké 
(it failed), and a new local Islamic FM began broadcasting in Bouaké, with Al-
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Bayane’s moral and technical support. On a different level, Muslims in the North 
expressed concern at what they saw as animism’s return in strength, symbolized 
by amulet-protected dozo hunters who emerged from the war with new positions 
of regional power. In an allegorical fashion, longing for peace has also been 
articulated by the desire to return to pray at the mosque. 
When it became obvious that opponents to the Gbagbo regime were not 
exclusively those having an affiliation with Islam or the North, attacks on Muslims 
– verbal or physical – receded. Crucial in this development was the creation of 
the Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace (RHDP) in May 2005, 
bringing together the PDCI and the RDR, former political enemies now convinced 
that alone, they can neither win elections nor reduce the PFI to the position of a 
marginal opposition party. Even the ivoirité polemics have calmed down, as 
many Akans among other southern autochthons have now distanced themselves 
from an ideology championed mostly by the so-called “BAD patriotic galaxy”, 
named after the Bété, Attié and Dida. If it is clear that Ivorian Muslims are no 
longer willing to accept political subordination and, even less, exclusion, it 
appears no less clear that they aspire to the re-establishment of a more peaceful, 
just, and cohesive national State and society in the old albeit reformed tradition of 
Côte d’Ivoire’s civil Islam. 
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